WellBeing International

WBI Studies Repository
2019

The Scientific Problems with Using Non-Human Animals to
Predict Human Response to Drugs and Disease
Ray Greek
Americans For Medical Advancement

Lisa A. Kramer
University of Toronto

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/phaamres
Part of the Animal Experimentation and Research Commons, Animal Studies Commons, and the Other
Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Greek, R., & Kramer, L. A. (2019). The scientific problems with using non-human animals to predict human
response to drugs and disease. In Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change (pp.
391-416). Brill.

This material is brought to you for free and open access
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI
Studies Repository. For more information, please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

CHAPTER 17

The Scientific Problems with Using Non-Human
Animals to Predict Human Response to Drugs
and Disease
Ray Greek

President, Americans for Medical Advancement, California, United States

Lisa A. Kramer
Professor of Finance, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada

1

Introduction

Every year, and in countries around the world, significant time and resources
are devoted to the noble cause of developing drugs to treat and cure human
disease. With rare exception, drug interventions cannot reach commercial
ization without safety and efficacy having first been demonstrated in animal
models. The intention of regulations, which require the use of animal models
in such contexts, is to ensure that only safe and effective drugs end up being
used by patients. Similarly, it is standard practice for researchers to employ
animal models in their attempts to understand the way diseases present and
progress in humans. Unfortunately, there exist serious theoretical and empiri
cal concerns regarding the standard practice of using non-human animals to
model human response to perturbations, such as drugs and disease. These
concerns are important because conducting disease research and drug devel
opment in a manner that is not supported by science will have suboptimal
implications for the humans who rely on that research, which encompass the
entire population. Based on complexity science, modem evolutionary biology,
and empirical evidence, we demonstrate that animal models have failed as
predictors of human response. That is, animal models do not and cannot have
acceptably high predictive value for human response to drugs and disease. By
this we mean that animal modeling, as a methodology, is for all practical pur
poses not predictive of human response to drugs and disease; and hence it
should be abandoned in favor of human-based research and testing, such as
personalized medicine, a new field that takes into account the unique genetic
make-up of each individual patient.
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People are accustomed to hearing about the ethical issues arising from the
use of non-human animals in biomedical research, testing, and science in gen
eral. But there are scientific issues with the practice as well. Researchers who
employ animal modeling often attempt to justify the practice based on claims
of accurately predicting human response to drugs and disease. For example,
Giles (2006, p. 981) states: "In the contentious world of animal research, one
question surfaces time and again: how useful are animal experiments as a way
to prepare for trials of medical treatments in humans? The issue is crucial, as
public opinion is behind animal research, only if it helps develop better drugs.
Consequently, scientists defending animal experiments insist they are essen
tial for safe clinical trials, whereas animal-rights activists vehemently maintain
that they are useless".
One need not search hard to find examples claiming non-human animals
play an essential role in the quest to treat and cure human disease. For ex
ample, the American Physiological Society (APA) (2017) states on its website:
"Animals are used in research to develop drugs and medical procedures to treat
diseases." Andrew B. Rudczynski, Yale University's associate vice president for
research administration, stated in a letter to the editor (20n): "[T]he basic re
search model used by Yale University and its peer institutions is scientifically
valid and predictive of human disease". Michael F. Jacobson, executive direc
tor of the Center for Science in the Public Interest (2008) stated: "We must
test animals to determine whether a substance causes cancer". Huff, Jacobsen,
and Davis (2008, p. 1439) stated: "Chemical carcinogenesis bioassays in animals
have long been recognized and accepted as valid predictors of potential cancer
hazards to humans." Lin (1995, p. 1008) stated: "Although the validity of animal
testing to predict efficacy and or safety in humans has been questioned, it is
generally believed that data from animal studies can be reasonably extrapolat
ed to humans with the application of appropriate pharmacokinetic principles
[.... ] From an evolutionary point of view, all mammals are similar, because they
originate from a common ancestor, yet they differentiate because of their dis
similar environmental adaptations".
While it can be argued that there may be scientifically justified grounds for
the use of non-human animals in some contexts, other than those that involve
predicting human responses, it is most common to see attempts to justify the
use of non-human animals for applications to human health (see Kramer
and Greek (2018), for additional discussion of this point). Therefore, it is ap
propriate to carefully examine the claimed validity of the animal model for
predicting human outcomes.
To that end, consider Trans-Species Modeling Theory (TSMT), a concept
that was formalized by Greek and Hansen (2013), based on a combination of
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extensive previous research on complex systems science and evolutionary bi
ology, as summarized by authors, including Greek and Rice (2012), LaFollette
and Shanks (1996), LaFollette and Shanks (1998), Shanks and Greek (2008),
and Shanks and Greek (2009). TSMT states: "While trans-species extrapolation
is possible when perturbations concern lower levels of organization or when
studying morphology and function on the gross level, one evolved complex sys
tem will not be of predictive value for another when the perturbation affects
higher levels of organization" (Greek and Hansen, 2013, p. 254). That is, according
to science, the observation of a drug response in one species is uninformative
about the drug response in another species. This theory is based on complex
ity science, evolutionary biology, and empirical evidence. In the remainder of
this article, we explain why the fields of complexity science and evolutionary
biology are relevant to understanding animal modeling and evaluating the in
ability of animal models to predict human response to drugs and disease.
LaFollette and Shanks (1996) and the Medical Research Modernization
Committee (2006) were among the first to document systematically the meth
odological failure of using one evolved complex system to model another, in
terms of predicting outcomes. Subsequent work by Greek and Hansen (2013),
Greek and Rice (2012), Shanks and Pyles (2007), and Shanks and Greek (2009)
then led to the development of TSMT, which is the only theory (we intention
ally use the word theory as opposed to hypothesis; see National Academies of
Science Engineering Medicine, 2016) that accounts for both past and pres
ent successes and failures of animal modeling. It is also the only theory that
explains why animal models will never offer practical predictive value for
disease and drug research. To be clear, the aforementioned authors did not
discover evolution, complexity science, or any aspect of probability. Rather,
they relied on what had been previously published in those disciplines and
combined various insights to formalize the case against the use of animal mod
els to predict outcomes in other species.
TSMT was a paradigm shift in animal modeling analysis. Moreover, TSMT
was inclusive of valid past criticisms, while simultaneously explaining and
taking those criticisms further. For example, TSMT obviated the need to point
out that small differences in environments among lab animals influenced
results, as many anti-vivisectionists did and continue to do, because even
under perfect environmental conditions, one evolved complex system would
not be expected to have predictive value for another. Likewise, there is little
to no value in analyzing why one species has historically been inadequate for
predicting human response, because according to TSMT, no species, regard
less of genetic similarity, will ever be similar enough to another to serve as a
valid predictive model. TSMT is also more precise and has more explanatory
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power than general criticisms, such as species differ in their metabolisms. Fur
thermore, TSMT explains why increasing scientific rigor, the current mantra
for justifying the use of animal models, will have no effect on predictive value.
We now tum to examining the three pillars underlying TSMT, comprising
complex systems science, evolutionary biology, and empirical evidence.

2

Complex Systems

Advances in the field of complex systems have highlighted the poor predictive
value of animal modeling. The study of complex systems and chaotic systems,
currently usually classified under the general heading of complex systems,
dates back to the 1950s and began a revolution in physics, similar to that of
the early 1900s involving relativity and quantum mechanics (Gell-Mann, 1994;
Gleick, 2008; Goodwin, 2001).
The following are characteristics of simple systems:
- They are nothing more than the sum of their parts.
- They have predictable behaviors. (There are no unanticipated or unexpected
behaviors.)
- They are usually composed of just a few components.
- They can be intuitively understood.
- They are in equilibrium. (They are non-dynamic.)
- There are few interactions and feedback loops. (For example, compare a
primitive barter system in contrast to our modem market-based economy).
Rosen (1999, p. 392) states: "A system is simple if all its models are simulable.
A system that is not simple, and that accordingly must have a nonsimulable
model, is complex". This should give us pause: A complex system is nonsimu
lable. Note that simulable may mean different things to different people. When
scientists state that biological complex systems are nonsimulable, they mean
nonsimulable at the complex level. The aim of researchers who use animal
models is not to gain insight into the simple systems that are basic building
blocks of the complex system. For example, at the simple level, we can rely
on knowledge about simple systems to extrapolate that the final outcome for
two different species will be the same when, for example, they are perma
nently deprived of water or they are thrown out of an airplane at 30,000-feet
elevation. Researchers attempt to use non-human animals to model humans at
higher, complex levels of organization, because this is the level at which disease
and drug effects occur. So, when an animal modeler claims that their model
simulates a human, unless they are speaking of low levels of organization (much
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simpler than the levels at which drug and disease responses occur), this is not
possible.
In contrast to simple systems, complex systems are characterized by the following (see Figure 17.1 for a diagrammatic representation of a complex system):
Complex systems are composed of many parts that themselves have hierar
chal levels of organization.
Complex systems have feedback loops.
Complex systems exhibit self-organization.
Complex systems respond to perturbations in a nonlinear fashion. Because
small changes in a complex system can result in outcomes that are not pro
portional to the input, one biological complex system can die because of
what, at first, appears to be a minor change or difference between it and
another almost identical complex system (Morange, 2001; Pearson, 2002 ).
For example, Northrop (2011, p. xiv) states: "Early bioengineers, biophysi
cists, and systems physiologists tried to characterize certain physiological
regulators as linear and stationary. Initially, linear systems analysis was
inappropriately applied to certain complex, physiological regulators and

--- Characteristics of Complex Systems
A'complex' system

_________ Emergent behavior that cannot
be simply inferred from the
behavior of the components
Complex Systems
Involve:
Many
Components

I � ..

Dynamically
Interacting
and giving rise to
A Number of
Levels or Scale s

_j

L...-.;..;.....;.;..__,;_...;.;....;;;_-+-;.;.;.;......;.;.;..;.;.;.;__,;_...;..._______-L.

wh ich exhibit
Common
Behaviors

FIGURE 17.1

The characteristics of complex systems.
SOURCE: MARSHALL CLEMENS/IDIAGRAM (HTTPS://WWW.IDIAGRAM.COM)

Note: A complex system is built out of simple systems. As more and more
of these simple systems combine and form a complex system, the level of
organization increases and simulability decreases.
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control systems (e.g., pupil regulation and eye movement control), which
resulted in black-box, closed-loop models in which linear transfer function
modules were connected to a nonlinear module in a single feedback loop.
These were phenomenological input/output models that gave little insight
into the physiology and complexity of the systems".
Complex systems demonstrate redundancy and robustness. Complex sys
tems have redundant parts and, therefore, losing a part may not affect
function. Adding to this is robustness, which means that perturbations may
not result in dysfunction. Complex systems have emergent properties that
Aziz-Alaoui and Bertelle (2009, preface) define as follows: "Emergence and
complexity refer to the appearance of higher-level properties and behaviors
of a system that obviously comes from the collective dynamics of that sys
tem's components. These properties are not directly deductable from the
lower-level motion of that system. Emergent properties are properties of
the "whole" that are not possessed by any of the individual parts making
up that whole. Such phenomena exist in various domains and can be de
scribed, using complexity concepts and thematic knowledges."
Examples of emergent properties include the following from Van Regen
mortel (2002):
- The three physical states of water and phase transitions, such as boiling
point.
- The viscosity of water (individual water molecules have no viscosity).
- The color of a chemical.
- A melody arising from notes.
- The saltiness of sodium chloride.
- The specificity of an antibody.
- The immunogenicity of an antigen.
The components of complex systems can be grouped as modules, and the
modules communicate with each other. Nevertheless, failure in one module
does not necessarily spread to the system as a whole because of redundancy
and robustness.
Complex systems are dynamic. They communicate with, and change in re
sponse to, their environment.
The whole of a complex system is greater than the sum of its parts, and
hence complex systems have properties that cannot be determined even
with total knowledge of the components of the system. This limits the valid
ity of reductionism when studying complex systems.
Importantly for our discussion, complex systems are also very dependent on
initial conditions; for example, genetic make-up in the context of individuals
or species. This means that a very small change in the initial conditions of
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two otherwise identical complex systems (e.g., monozygotic twin humans),
may result in sickness for one but not the other. In strains of mice, knocking
out one gene has been shown to result in death for one strain, while the
other thrives (Belmaker et al., 2012; Bell and Spector, 2011; Bruder et al., 2008;
Castillo-Fernandez et al., 2014; Chapman and Hill, 2012; Czyz et al., 2012;
Dempster et al., 2011; LeCouter et al., 1998; Raineri et al., 2001; Pearson, 2002).
The sensitivity of complex systems, also known as nonlinear dynamic systems,
to initial conditions, in general, was demonstrated in principle in the 1960s by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathematician, Edward Lorenz, while
he was studying a weather model using a computer. Lorenz found significant
differences in outcomes using his model, when the initial conditions were
changed by a very small amount:
On a particular day in the winter of 1961, Lorenz wanted to re-examine a
sequence of data coming from his model. Instead of restarting the entire
run, he decided to save time and restart the run from somewhere in the
middle. Using data printouts, he entered the conditions at some point
near the middle of the previous run and re-started the model calcula
tion. What he found was very unusual and unexpected. The data from the
second run should have exactly matched the data from the first run.
While they matched at first, the runs eventually began to diverge dra
matically - the second run losing all resemblance to the first within a
few "model" months.
BRADLEY, 2010

FIGURE 17.2

Plots of the data from two simulations of weather response over time.
SOURCE: BRADLEY (2010)
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Plots of the time-series data from two of Lorenz's weather simulations ap
pear in Figure 17.2.
Lorenz rounded off a variable to three digits after the decimal instead of
six, and this resulted in the different values shown in Figure 17.2. While no one
knows which specific weather condition Lorenz recorded on the Y axis (it is
commonly assumed that time is shown on the X axis), we do know the fluctua
tions shown on the right-most portion of the Y axis are between extreme values,
and thus we see that a tiny perturbation in starting values (measured in units
smaller than three decimal places), eventually yielded opposite predictions in
the simulated weather. This experiment is the origin of expressions, such as, "a
butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, and it rains in America." Very small changes in
initial conditions can result in dramatically different outcomes in complex sys
tems. In fact, this behavior is a defining characteristic of a complex or chaotic
system (Gleick, 2008). Obviously, Lorenz's computer program was intended to
simulate weather, but because it lacked sufficiently detailed inputs, the model
yielded dramatically different outputs depending on very small changes in the
inputs - the initial conditions. This example demonstrates how a particu
lar model, in this case a computer program, can be inadequate for simulat
ing a complex system. Likewise, animal models are inadequate for predicting
human response to drugs and disease.
Examples of complex systems include cells, humans, non-human animals,
ecosystems, economies, ant colonies, social interaction, and the United States
electrical grid. For more on biological complex systems, see Ahn et al. (2006),
Gell-Mann (1994), Goodwin (2001), Greek (2013c), Greek and Rice (2012),
Kitano (2002); Morowitz (2002), Sole and Goodwin (2002), Van Regenmortel
(2004a, b), Van Regenmortel and Hull (2002), Vojinovic (2015a, b).
It is not easy to understand complex systems. Consider the following sum
mary of the necessary background for understanding complex systems:
This introductory textbook is intended for use in a one-semester course
to acquaint biomedical engineers, biophysicists, systems physiologists,
ecologists, biologists, and other scientists, in general, with complex
ity and complex systems. I have focused on biochemical, genomic, and
physiological complex systems, and I have also introduced the reader to
the inherent complexity in economic systems [.... ] Reader background:
Readers should have had college courses in algebra, calculus, ordinary
differential equations, and linear algebra, and, hopefully, engineering
systems analysis. They should also have had basic college courses in
chemistry, biochemistry, cell biology, and ideally even in human physi
ology and anatomy. This is the broad background that is required in the
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interdisciplinary fields of biomedical engineering, biophysics, systems
physiology, and economics.
NORTHROP, 2011, pp. xiii-xvii

Northrop (2011, p. xiii) also notes: "Broadly stated, we consider that complex
ity is a subjective measure of the difficulty in describing and modeling a system
(thing or process), and thus being able to predict its behavior" (emphasis
added). Again we note the fact that complex systems are difficult to model in
terms of being able to predict outcomes to perturbations.
Vicsek (2002, p. 131) states:
In the past, mankind has learned to understand reality through simplifi
cation and analysis. Some important simple systems are successful ideal
izations or primitive models of particular real situations - for example, a
perfect sphere rolling down an absolutely smooth slope in a vacuum. This is
the world of Newtonian mechanics, and it ignores a huge number of other,
simultaneously acting factors. Although it might sometimes not matter
that details such as the motions of the billions of atoms dancing inside the
sphere's material are ignored, in other cases reductionism may lead to in
correct conclusions. In complex systems, we accept that processes that occur
simultaneously on different scales or levels are important, and the intricate
behaviour of the whole system depends on its units in a nontrivial way. Here,
the description of the entire system's behaviour requires a qualitatively new
theory, because the Laws that describe its behaviour are qualitatively differ
entfrom those that govern its individual units." (Emphasis added)
Animal modeling seeks to use one complex system, be it a mouse or a monkey,
to predict responses to perturbations that occur at higher levels of organiza
tion, of another complex system - a human. To do so ignores the most basic
fundamental features of complex systems, discussed above. Given those fea
tures, it is outside the realm of science to use one complex system in expecta
tion of its having predictive value for another, when the perturbation affects
higher levels of organization.

3

Evolutionary Biology

Informally, evolution can be thought of as small changes in genes (i.e., initial
conditions) that occur over long periods of time, resulting in new species with
traits different from those of the ancestor organism. In other words, chimpanzees
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and humans are both different from the primate that we descended from, and
we are different from each other. But the notion that differences among genes
can result in new species is separate from the fact that very small differences in
genes can also lead to members of the same species reacting quite differently
to drugs and disease. Humans and non-human animals are examples of com
plex systems that have evolved over time - their initial conditions changed
in the form of genetic make-up, and these changes affected the organism
in a nonlinear fashion, just as we saw in Lorenz's computer model of weather.
Even for two individuals within the same species, small differences in D NA
can mean the difference between life and death. A tiny difference of one ami
no acid within the human chromosome is all that separates a patient with
life-threatening sickle cell anemia from those of us who can live free of that
condition. Dramatic differences can exist across species without changes in
amino acid sequences. Genes are regulated, turned on and off, by other genes.
For example, mice and humans share the gene that allows mice to grow a tail
(Graham, 2002 ). The reasons humans do not normally grow a tail during devel
opment is that the gene is never turned on (or expressed). Differences in gene
regulation and expression vary within and between species and account for
differences in response to drugs and disease (Kasowski et al., 2010; Marchetto
et al., 2013; Morley et al., 2004; Pritchard et al., 2006; Rifkin, Kim and White,
2003; Rosenberg et al., 2002; Sandberg et al., 2000; Seok et al., 2013; Storey et al.,
2007; Suzuki and Nakayama, 2003; Warren et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2008). So,
while it is a fact that humans share a large percentage of their genes with other
mammals, this fact is largely immaterial in terms of predicting how humans
will respond to perturbations, such as drugs and disease. For example, the pro
gression of HIV to AI D S , which is common in humans, has been very rarely ob
served in great apes. On the matter of non-human primates, Varki and Altheide
(2005, p. 1746 ) write "[I]t is a striking paradox that chimpanzees are in fact not
good models for many major human diseases/conditions".
Based on facts from the theory of evolution and complexity science, there
are robust theoretical reasons to conclude that, for all practical purposes, one
species will have no predictive value for the response to perturbations that
occur at higher levels of organization; and drugs and disease affect higher
levels of organization. Note that we are not saying humans and non-human
animals cannot ever respond similarly to the same drug or disease. They do
in some instances. However, in order for there to be scientific merit in using
non-human animals as predictive models for humans, the models would have
to have a high predictive value as calculated using concepts we discuss in the
following section. Consistent with theory, extensive empirical evidence shows
that animal models do not have high predictive value for human response to
drugs and disease, rendering their use in that context unscientific.
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Empirical Evidence: The Failure of the Animal Model in Terms of
Predictive Value for Humans

We now delve into empirical evidence regarding the inability of the animal
model to predict human response to drugs and disease. By comparing how well
an animal-based test or research method corresponds to human results, we
can determine how much predictive value the modality has. Predictive value
is measured in science by using the calculations summarized in Table 17.1. In
the discussion that follows, we refer to quantities from this table, such as gold
standard, false positive, and false negative. Any given test or system can gener
ally be compared to a gold standard, which is the most accurate one available
under reasonable conditions.
For example, the gold standard for determining whether a patient has a col
lapsed lung is a computerized axial tomography ( C T ) scan of the chest. Even
clinically insignificant cases of a collapsed lung can be detected with a C T scan
and clinically significant collapses are detected essentially 100% of the time.
In reality, patients are assessed with a chest x-ray instead of a C T scan because
an x-ray is quicker, easier, and less expensive than a C T scan, and clinically
significant collapses are detected by x-ray a very, very high percentage of the
time. To determine the predictive value of the chest x-ray, one would perform
both diagnostic tests on a group of patients and the calculations in Table 17.1.
A positive chest x-ray (an x-ray that revealed a collapsed lung) in light of a
positive C T scan would be counted as a true positive (TP ) and listed under
gold standard positive; while a negative chest x-ray (no collapsed lung) in light
of a negative C T scan would be listed as true negative (TN) and listed under
gold standard negative. Similarly, a negative x-ray in light of a positive C T scan
would be labeled a false negative (FN); and a positive chest x-ray in conjunc
tion with a negative C T scan would be a false positive (FP) (see Nagarsheth and
Kurek, 2011, for an example of this).
In the case of evaluating animal models, outcomes in humans would be
the gold standard. These same calculations can be performed for any test or
modality where a gold standard can be known in contexts within and outside
of biomedical science, for example to determine whether a patient has cancer,
to determine whether a computer model can predict an outcome in engineer
ing or business, or to determine the predictive value of drug sniffing dogs in
airports. For more details see Greek ( 2014b ).
Not all tests or methods need to have a high predictive value to be useful.
For example, if you devised a method of winning at the blackjack table more
than 50% of the time and bet appropriately each time and played long enough,
probabilistically you would beat the house. But in medical science, we need
much higher predictive values than 0.5. Even a probability of 0.999 can be
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TAB L E 1 7 . I

Binary classification test and formulas for determining how well a test or practice
compares with the most accurate test available under reasonable conditions.

Gold Standard:

Test:

T+
T-

GS+
TP
FN

GS
FP
TN

Calculations:
Sensitivity = T P /(T P +FN )
Specificity = T N /(FP+ T N )
Positive Predictive Value (PPv) = TP /(TP+FP) = % of all positives that are true
positives
Negative Predictive Value (NPV) = TN /(FN +T N ) = % of all negatives that are true
negatives
Abbreviations:
T- = Test negative
T + = Test positive
FP = False positive
TP = True positive
FN = False negative
TN = True negative
GS- = Gold standard negative
G S + = Gold standard positive

inadequate. Drugs that harm even a very small percentage of patients, even
one out of 1,000, have been pulled off the market because of life-threating side
effects, such as total liver failure, heart attack, or stroke. Examples of widely
marketed drugs that have been withdrawn due to unanticipated fatalities in
clude Vioxx (rofecoxib), Propulsid (cisapride), and Rezulin (troglitazone). See
Graham et al. (2005) and Attarwala (2010) for details on such instances.
So what is an acceptable level of predictive value to expect from animal
modeling? To answer this question, first we need to emphasize that accept
able predictive value, like many things in life, varies depending on the context,
as the blackjack example illustrates. Consider the case of deeming whether
a species exhibits the trait of sentience, which is highly valued in the animal
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protection movement as a feature to take into account when considering the
ethics of animal modeling. Sentience can be assessed using criteria for which
we could attempt to measure predictive value; but, nevertheless, a large gray
zone emerges. Chimpanzees are clearly sentient, as are mammals in general.
But when we consider invertebrates, the situation becomes less clear. Octopi
appear to be both sentient and sapient, but what about sponges, worms, jel
lyfish, and the common fruit fly? To date we do not have strong evidence that
these entities exhibit sentience, but we may simply lack the power to detect
sentience in all cases where it exists. Yet, our inability to conclude with cer
tainty that sponges are sentient does not mean we can ignore the fact that
chimpanzees do demonstrably exhibit sentience. The precautionary principle
should be employed in cases where great suffering is at stake, meaning that
our ability to deem a particular species as sentient should not be predicated
on the requirement that there exists an assessment method with a predictive
value as high as 0.99.
Turning back to the matter at hand, predictive values for responses to drugs
in development typically cluster around or below 0.5, which makes them no
more useful for prediction than flipping a coin. Predictive values this low are of
no use in medical science. When values in the 0.7 to 0.9 range are seen, physi
cians and medical scientists cannot rely on the results, test, or modality alone,
without verifying the item in question with other tests or modalities. To do so
would be unethical; the patient deserves greater certainty before proceeding.
Science in general relies on consilience, and medical research is not an excep
tion. In this case, when deciding which modality to use, one must consider
the mathematics of complex systems and the initial conditions in the form of
evolutionary biology. Because animal models are used to make the life-altering
decision of whether to take a drug to human trials or to abandon it, even values
greater than 0.9 can be deemed inadequate and unacceptably costly in terms
of the likelihood of adverse human consequences.
The way around this problem of identifying the right predictive value is
addressed by Greek and Greek (2004), Greek, Menache and Rice (2012), and
Shanks and Greek (2009), and is summarized by Kramer and Greek (2018).
The solution involves the use of human-based research and testing through
personalized medicine; that is, matching gene(s) to drugs and disease in each
patient. Based on the science of complex systems and evolutionary biology,
we know categorically that using non-human animal models has unaccept
ably low predictive value for human responses to drugs and disease. Thus, on
balance, the use of animal models in drug development and disease research
should be abandoned immediately for the same reasons that society has aban
doned wrong or harmful medical practices such as phrenology, bloodletting,
and trephination; they were simply ineffective.
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We now tum to specific examples of the poor predictive value of animal
models, starting with early empirical evidence dating back as early as the 1990s
and ending with recent sets of evidence from 2016 that summarize decades of
findings.
Data from Suter (1990) and the nth edition of the Catalog of Teratogenic
Agents (Shepard and Lemire, 2004) demonstrate the importance of using
predictive values. Suter reported on the development of six drugs where
humans and non-human animals shared 22 side effects. Suter's data revealed
that animal models had a positive predictive value of 0.31. That is, if a side ef
fect was seen in the animal models it had only a 31% chance of being seen in
humans for these six drugs. This prediction rate, which is below that expected
from a coin toss (heads we abandon the drug because of danger, and tails we
continue to develop the drug), illustrates the failure of these animal models as
predictors for human response. A naive but common retort to this fact is that if
animal models derailed any drug that would have harmed humans, it is worth
using animal models. The fallacy of this view becomes evident when consider
ing the following assessment of empirical evidence on using animal models to
predict human birth defects.
The Catalog of Teratogenic Agents lists more than 3,100 agents, of which
about 1,500 can produce congenital anomalies (birth defects) in experimental
animals but not in humans. These are known as false positives. Furthermore,
only about 40 cause birth defects in both humans and non-human animals.
These are known as true positives. Based on these numbers and the formulas
in Table 17.11 one can calculate a value of 3°/o for the positive predictive value.
A positive predictive value of 3°/o tells us that for any given birth defect noted
in non-human animals, there is only a 3°/o chance that it will also be seen in
humans. A predictive value of 3°/o is obviously extremely poor but is consistent
with the general lack of predictive value in using animal models to determine
whether compounds are harmful to developing fetuses (see Greek, Shanks and
Rice, 2011, for more on teratogenicity and animal models). This means that for
any drug that tests positive for birth defects, when tested for teratogenicity in
animal models, there is about a 3% chance that it will harm human babies in
utero. Predictive value does not mean that 3°/o of drugs that would have caused
birth defects will be abandoned in development. Instead it means that of 100
drugs tested and shown to harm animal fetuses, about three may harm the
human fetus. Unfortunately, we do not know which three. So, abandoning a
drug in development based on a test that has a low predictive value does not
save babies. Moreover, when human health is involved, low predictive value
means anything below 90%-95%; and, often times, even a probability of 99%
is inadequate to base treatment on. The predictive value of animal modeling
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falls far below 99%; for example, 3% in the above teratogenicity example. For
more on this point, see Greek (2013a, b, 2014b), Greek and Greek (2010), and
Shanks, Greek, and Greek (2009).
Values this low mean animal modeling per se has, for all practical purposes, no
predictive value for human response to drugs and disease. Some researchers ar
gue that any predictive value greater than zero means animal models have some
predictive value. However, given the scope for serious adverse consequences,
including death, the threshold number required in medical science has to be
much higher than the typically observed 3% to 55% range of values seen when
calculating the predictive value of animal modeling (see previous references);
hence the paradigm of animal modeling cannot be justified scientifically in
this context. Medical science requires higher predictive values than one needs
for winning at the blackjack table.
In our discussion of the predictive value of animal models, we have focused
so far on the context of response to drugs. It is also illuminating to consider
predictive value in the context of disease research. Scientists are now match
ing gene response to disease, and great variation is being observed across
species. For instance, Seok et al. (2013) studied inflammatory processes, such
as sepsis, in mice and humans and found no correlation between what the
genes and responses did in mice versus what they did in humans. The follow
ing statement, by science journalist Dolgin (2013, p. 118), puts Seok's and col
leagues' findings in context: "Yet, despite the fact that some compounds have
repeatedly reversed the symptoms of sepsis in animal tests, not a single drug
has proven effective in human clinical trials, even though more than 30,000
people have been included in randomized controlled studies, involving candi
date antisepsis agents over the past 25 years".
Thus, in searching for a treatment for sepsis, tens of thousands of people
were exposed to the risks of a new drug, and billions of dollars were wasted
based on animal studies, the results of which proved unrelated to human out
comes. Even more patients were unable to access a potentially effective drug
that might have been identified had the resources been dedicated instead to
human-based research.
The failure of animal models in these cases appears to be due to differences
in gene response between humans and mice (Seok et al., 2013; Warren et al.,
2014). Considering that humans and non-human animals are evolved complex
systems, there is no reason to expect other diseases or conditions would allow
animal models to have high predictive value. Indeed, many diseases have been
studied and similarity in responses among species found only at very low rates
and usually in retrospect (Enna and Williams, 2009; Hau, 2003; Lin, 1995). (Note
that basic science research is prone to the same critique. Many researchers now
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claim that basic research on non-human animals has high predictive value for
humans. See, for example, Devoy et al., 2012; Groenink, Folkerts and Schuurman,
2015; Katzner et al., 2009; National Science Foundation, 2011; Rudczynski, 2011;
van Meer, Graham and Schuurman, 2015. Such claims invite the same scrutiny
as claims about predictive value in drug development and disease research.)
Based on the track record of drugs that have been tested on non-human
animals to date, the poor predictive value of animal models used in preclinical
research, and the fact that humans and non-human animals are evolved
complex systems, there is every reason to believe yet-to-be-developed drugs
identified through the use of animal models will similarly exhibit profoundly
different responses in non-human animals versus humans. The exceptions to
this rule occur when the perturbation affects levels of organization where the
system under analysis is simple or where conserved processes are involved. But
even when conserved processes are being studied (e.g., the mechanism for cell
replication, the cytochrome P450s, and the presence of various receptors), the
outcomes to perturbations to these processes vary among species (Greek and
Rice, 2012).
Turning to other medical applications, around 100 vaccines have been
shown to be effective against HIV-like viruses in animal models, to date. None
have been effective in humans (Bailey, 2008; Editorial, 2007; Gamble and Mat
thews, 2010). More than a thousand drugs have been seen to protect against
nervous system damage in animal models of stroke. Again, none have been
protective in humans (Dimagl, 2006; Dimagl and Macleod, 2009; Macleod,
2004; O'Collins et al., 2011; O'Collins et al., 2006; Sena et al., 2007). Fouad, Hurd
and Magnuson (2013) identify over 10,000 publications modeling spinal cord
injury in rats and mice. Many treatments identified in those publications have
been effective in non-human animals but failed in humans, and spinal cord
injury resulting in paralysis remains incurable in humans.
The predictive value of the above-mentioned medical applications would
be roughly zero. In order to prove a test or practice has poor predictive value
(as opposed to predictive value numerically equal to zero), one only has to
show a relatively small number of failures compared to the successes. The
above examples are adequate. Conversely, proving a practice has high predic
tive value requires examples from a large number of studies. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no studies of any kind that show high predictive value
of animal models for drugs or disease. Drawing on knowledge from complex
systems and the theory of evolution, one can easily infer that the above ex
amples are representative of all animal models and are not exceptions to the
rule. Moreover, the studies described above are a small sample of the many
such instances that have been recorded in the medical literature showing the
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animal model's overall lack of predictive value. For more examples see Arrow
smith (2011a, b), Chiou et al. (2000), Ennever et al. (1987), Fletcher (1978), Grass
and Sinko (2002), Hughes (2008), Litchfield (1962), Igarashi et al. (1995, 1996),
Johnson et al. (2001), Kola and Landis (2004), Kummar et al. (2007), Lesko
and Woodcock (2004), Lumley (1990), Mahmood (2000), Smith and Caldwell
(1977), Spriet-Pourra and Auriche (1994), van Meer et al. (2012), and Weaver et
al. (2003). Despite the above, important international regulatory bodies still
require animal-based research and testing. See for example, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018) and the International
Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals
for Human Use (2011).
The overall consequence of continued reliance on animal models is evi
dent when considering the costly failures seen in drug development. For the
past few decades, arguably the period when our advanced scientific sophisti
cation should have been yielding the greatest progress in drug development,
the success rate in human clinical trials of drugs that entered those trials,
based on data from animals, was about 10% (see, e.g., B I O , Biomedictracker
and Amplion, 2016; Smietana, Siatkowski and Moller, 2016). Safety/toxicity and
efficacy are the two characteristics researchers seek to evaluate when using
animal models in drug development. But drugs developed using animal mod
els have systematically failed in human clinical trials for both safety/toxicity
reasons and efficacy reasons. Moreover, even more drugs have failed when
prescribed to large numbers of people, dropping the success rate below 10%.
Granted there are many reasons that drugs fail to enter the market, but these
are rare in comparison to the frequency with which efficacy and safety issues
have failed to be revealed by animal modeling.
Based on our discussion above of evolved complex systems, evolution, and
the empirical data, we conclude that animal models, overall, do not and can
not have a numeric predictive value above about 50%; and, hence, we conclude
that, for all practical purposes, they have no predictive value. By this we do not
mean the predictive value of any given animal model is exactly equal to zero,
but rather that the predictive value is so low that it is necessarily below any
reasonable threshold to be considered useful in medical science in general.

5

Summary

Drawing on theoretical principles, based on evolutionary biology and complex
systems, and based on extensive empirical evidence, the position that animal
modeling has predictive value for human response to drugs in general has
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been falsified. TSMT is a theory, and, like all scientific theories, it is consistent
with this definition from the National Academies of Science Engineering Med
icine (2016): "In everyday usage, theory often refers to a hunch or a speculation.
When people say, 'I have a theory about why that happened,' they are often
drawing a conclusion based on fragmentary or inconclusive evidence. The for
mal scientific definition of theory is quite different from the everyday meaning
of the word. It refers to a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature
that is supported by a vast body of evidence".
Researchers who aim to improve human outcomes cannot continue to treat
humans and non-human animals as simple systems and expect results based
on non-human animals to translate to human patients. TSMT is the first com
prehensive theory that explains the past failures and apparent successes of
animal modeling and also explains why animal models will never achieve pre
dictive value and, thus, should be abandoned.
We acknowledge that the scientific community as a whole is not yet familiar
with TSMT; but we are confident that, in time, a consensus will be reached.
Kramer and Greek (2018) explain the obstacles that must be overcome to
ensure that drug development and the study of diseases are based on sound
science. This will require changes to the regulations that currently mandate
the use of animal models. Furthermore, Kramer and Greek (2018) discuss
modern techniques that fall under the heading of personalized medicine,
which offer treatments and cures that are customized to a patient's individual
genetic make-up and, hence, sidestep the significant risks associated with the
continued blind reliance on methods arising from the use of animal models.

Acknowledgements

We thank Marshall Clemens for allowing us to use his complex systems figure.

References
Ahn, A.C., M. Tewari, C.S. Poon and R.S. Phillips (2006). The Limits of Reductionism
in Medicine: Could Systems Biology Offer an Alternative?. PLoS Medicine, 3(6),
p. e208.
American Physiological Society (APA) (2017). WhyDo Scientists UseAnimals inResearch?
[ online] Available at: http://www.the-aps.org/mm/sciencepolicy/animalresearch/
publications/animals/questi.html [ Accessed 8 June 2017 ] .
Arrowsmith, J. (2011a). Trial Watch: Phase I I Failures: 2008-2010. Nature Reviews Drug
Discovery, 10, pp. 328-329.
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS WITH USING NON-HUMAN ANIMALS

409

Arrowsmith, J. (2011b). Trial Watch: Phase III and Submission Failures: 2008-2010.
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 10, p. 87.
Attarwala, H. (2010). T GN1412: From Discovery to Disaster. Journal of Young Pharma
cists, 2(3), pp. 332-336.
Aziz-Alaoui, M. and C. Bertelle, eds. ( 2009 ). From system complexity to emergent proper
ties. Berlin: Springer.
Bailey, J. ( 2008 ). An Assessment of the Role of Chimpanzees in AID S Vaccine Research.
Alternatives to Laboratory Animals, 36, pp. 381-428.
Bell, J.T. and T.D. Spector (2011). A Twin Approach to Unraveling Epigenetics. Trends in
Genetics, 27(3), pp. 116-125.
Belmaker, R.H., Y. Bersudsky and G. Agam (2012). Individual Differences and Evidence
based Psychopharmacology. BMC Medicine, 10:110.
BIO, Biomedtracker, and Amplion ( 2016). Clinical Development Success Rates 2006-2015.
[ online] Available at: https:/ /www.bio.org/sites/default/files/Clinical%20Develop
men t%20 Succe ss %20 Rates %20200 6-2015 %20-%2 oB I 0, %20 Biomed tracker,
%20Amplion%202016.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2018].
Bradley, L. ( 2010) The Butterfly Effect. [ online] Available at: http:/ /www.stsci.
edu/-lbradley/seminar/butterfly.html [ Accessed 8 June 2017] .
Bruder, C.E., A. Piotrowski, A.A. Gijsbers, R. Andersson, S. Erickson, T. Diaz de Stahl, U.
Menzei, J. Sandgren, D. von Tell, A. Poplawski, M. Crowley, C. Crasto, E.C. Partridge,
H. Tiwari, D.B. Allison, J. Komorowski, G.J. van Ommen, D.I. Boomsma, N.L. Peder
sen, J.T. den Dunnen, K Wirdefeldt and J.P. Dumanski (2008). Phenotypically Con
cordant and Discordant Monozygotic Twins Display Different DNA Copy-number
variation Profiles. American]ournal ofHuman Genetics, 82(3), pp. 763-771.
Castillo-Fernandez, J.E., T.D. Spector and J.T. Bell (2014). Epigenetics of Discordant
Monozygotic Twins: Implications for Disease. Genome Medicine, 6: 60.
Center for Science in the Public Interest ( 2008). Longer Tests on Lab Animals Urgedfor
Potential Carcinogens. [ online] Available at: http:/ /www.cspinet.org/new/200811172.
html [ Accessed 8 June 2017 ] .
Chapman, S.J. and A.V.S. Hill ( 2012 ) . Human Genetic Susceptibility to Infectious Dis
ease. Nature Reviews Genetics, 13, pp. 175-188.
Chiou, W.L., H.Y. Jeong, S.M. Chung and T.C. Wu ( 2000 ). Evaluation of Using Dog as an
Animal Model to Study the Fraction of Oral Dose Absorbed of 43 Drugs in Humans.
Pharmaceutial Research, 17(2), pp. 135-140.
Czyz, W., J.M. Morahan, G.C. Ebers and S.V. Ramagopalan (2012). Genetic, Environmen
tal, and Stochastic Factors in Monozygotic Twin Discordance with a Focus on Epi
genetic Differences. BMC Medicine, 10(93).
Dempster, E.L., R. Pidsley, L.C. Schalkwyk, S. Owens, A. Georgiades, F. Kane, S. Kalidin
di, M. Picchioni, E Kravarti. T. Toulopoulou, R.M. Murray and J. Mill (2011). Disease
associated Epigenetic Changes in Monozygotic Twins Discordant for Schizophrenia
and Bipolar Disorder. Human Molecular Genetics, 20(24), pp. 4786-4796.
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

410

GREEK AND KRAMER

Devoy, A., R.K.A. Bunton-Stasyshyn, V.L.J. Tybulewicz, A.J.H. Smith and E.M.C. Fisher
(2012). Genomically Humanized Mice: Technologies and Promises. Nature Reviews
Genetics, 13, pp. 14-20.
Dimagl, U. (2006). Bench to Bedside: The Quest for Quality in Experimental Stroke
Research.Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and Metabolism, 26( 12 ), pp. 1465-1478.
Dimagl, U. and M.R. Macleod ( 2009 ). Stroke Research at a Road Block: The Streets from
Adversity Should Be Paved with Meta-analysis and Good Laboratory Practice. Brit
ishjournaf ofPharmacology, 157(7), pp. 1154-1156.
Dolgin, E. (2013). Animal Rule for Drug Approval Creates a Jungle of Confusion. Nature
Medicine, 19(2), pp. 118-119.
Editorial ( 2007 ). Cold Shower for A I D S Vaccines. Nature Medicine, 13(12 ), pp. 1389-1390.
Enna, S.J. and M Williams. ( 2009 ). Defining the Role of Pharmacology in the Emerging
World of Translational Research. Advances in Pharmacology, 57, pp. 1-30.
Ennever, F.K., T.J. Noonan and H.S. Rosenkranz (1987). The Predictivity of Ani
mal Bioassays and Short-term Genotoxicity Tests for Carcinogenicity and Non
carcinogenicity to Humans. Mutagenesis, 2(2), pp. 73-78.
Fletcher, A.P. (1978). Drug safety tests and subsequent clinical experience. journal of
the Royal Society ofMedicine, 71(9), pp. 693-696.
Fouad, K., C. Hurd and D.S.K. Magnuson (2013). Functional Testing in Animal Models
of Spinal Cord Injury: Not as Straight Forward as One Would Think. Frontiers in
Integrative Neuroscience, 7, p. 85.
Gamble, L.J. and Q.L. Matthews ( 2010 ). Current Progress in the Development of a Pro
phylactic Vaccine for HIV-1. Drug Design, Development and Therapy, 5(9), pp. 9-26.
Gell-Mann, M.. (1994). The quark and thejaguar: Adventures in the simple and complex.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Giles, J. (2006). Animal Experiments Under Fire for Poor Design. Nature, 444(7122),
p. 981.
Gleick, J. (2008). Chaos. Making a new science. London: Penguin Books.
Goodwin, B. (2001). How the Leopard changed its spots: The evolution of complexity.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Graham, D.J., D. Campen, R. Hui, M. Spence, C Cheetham. G. Levy, S. Shoor and W.A.
Ray (2005). Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death in Pa
tients Treated with Cyclo-oxygenase 2 Selective and Non-selective, Non-steroidal
Anti-inflammatory Drugs: Nested Case-control Study. The Lancet, 365(9458),
pp. 475-481.
Graham, S. (2002). Mouse Genome Sequenced. Scientific American. [online] Avail
able at: https:/ /www.scientificamerican.com/article/mouse-genome-sequenced/
Accessed 8 June 2017.
Grass, G.M. and P.J. Sinko (2002). Physiologically-based Pharmacokinetic Simulation
Modelling. Advanced Drug Delivery Review, 54(3), pp. 433-451.

Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS WITH USING NON-HUMAN ANIMALS

411

Greek, R. (2013a). Animal models in drug development. In: S. Gowder, ed., New Insights
into Toxicity and Drug Testing. Manhattan: InTech, pp. 124-152.
Greek, R. (2013b). Animal models of cancer in light of evolutionary biology and
complexity science. In: The Research and Biology of Cancer. Hong Kong: iConcept
Press.
Greek, R. ( 2013c ). Evolved Complex Systems. Biological Systems: Open Access, 2, p. e107.
Greek, R. (2014a). A Discussion of the Role of Complex Evolved Systems in the De
velopment of invasive Cardiovascular Interventions as Illustrated by the Blalock
Taussig Shunt and Intra-arterial Stents. Biological Systems: Open Access, 3, p. 1.
Greek, R. (2014b). The Ethical Implications for Humans in light of the Poor Predic
tive Value of Animal Models. International Journal of Clinical Medicine, 5(16),
pp. 966-1005.
Greek, R. andJ. Greek ( 2004 ). What will we do ifwe don't experiment on animals?. Victo
ria: Trafford Publishing.
Greek, R. and J. Greek (2010 ). Is the Use of Sentient Animals in Basic Research Justifi
able?. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine, 5:14.
Greek, R. and L.A. Hansen (2013). Questions Regarding the Predictive Value of One
Evolved Complex Adaptive System for a Second: Exemplified by the SOD1 Mouse.
Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 113(2 ), pp. 231-153.
Greek, R., A. Menache and M.J. Rice (2012). Animal Models in an Age of Personalized
Medicine. Personalized Medicine, 9(1), pp. 47-64.
Greek, R. and M.J. Rice (2012). Animal Models and Conserved Processes. Theoretical
Biology and Medical Modelling, 9:40. [ online] Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov /pmc/ articles/PMC3533755/pdf/1742-4682-9-40.pdf [Accessed 1 February
2018] .
Greek, R., N. Shanks and M.J. Rice (2011). The History and Implications of Testing Tha
lidomide on Animals. TheJournal ofPhilosophy, Science, & Law, 11(3) pp. 1-32.
Groenink, L. (2015). Introduction: European Journal of Pharmacology, Special Issue
on Translational Value of Animal Models. European Journal of Pharmacology, 759,
pp. 1-2.
Hau, J. (2003). Animal models. In: J. Hau and G.L. van Hoosier, Jr., eds., Handbook of
Laboratory Animal Science, 2nd ed. Vol. II. Boca Raton: CRC Press, pp. 1-9.
Huff, J., M.F. Jacobson and D.L. Davis (2008). The Limits of Two-year Bioassay Exposure
Regimens for identifying Chemical Carcinogens. Environmental Health Perspectives,
116, (11), pp. 1439-1442.
Hughes, B. (2008). Industry Concern over EU Hepatotoxicity Guidance. Nature Reviews
Drug Discovery, 7, p. 719.
Igarashi, T., S. Nakane and T. Kitagawa (1995). Predictability of Clinical Adverse Reac
tions of Drugs by General Pharmacology Studies. Journal of Toxicological Science,
20(2), pp. 77-92.

Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

412

GRE E K AND KRAM E R

Igarashi, T., T . Yabe and K. Noda (1996). Study Design and Statistical Analysis of Toxi
cokinetics: A Report of JPMA Investigation of Case Studies.Journal of Toxicological
Science, 21(5), pp. 497-504.
International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceu
ticals for Human Use (ICH) (2011). ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline. Preclinical
Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology-Derived Pharmaceuticals S6(R1 ). [ online] Avail
able at: http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/
Safety/S6_Ri/Step4/S6_Ri_Guideline.pdf [ Accessed 1 February 2018] .
Johnson, J.I., S. Decker, D. Zaharevitz, L.V. Rubinstein, J.M. Venditti, S. Schepartz, S.
Kalyandrug, M. Christian, S. Arbuck, M. Hollingshead and E.A. Sausville ( 2001 ).
Relationships Between Drug Activity in NCI Preclinical In Vitro and In Vivo Models
and Early Clinical Trials. Britishjournal of Cancer, 84( 10 ), pp. 1424-1431.
Kasowski, M., F. Grubert, C. Heffelfinger, M. Hariharan, A. Asabere, S. Waszak, L.
Habegger, J. Rozowsky, M. Shi, A.E. Urban, M.Y. Hong, KJ. Karczewski, W. Huber,
S.M. Weissman, M.B. Gerstein, J.O. Korbel and M. Snyder (2010). Variation in Tran
scription Factor Binding Among Humans. Science, 328(5975), pp. 232-235.
Katzner, S., I. Nauhaus, A. Benucci, V. Bonin, D.L. Ringach and M. Carandini (2009). Lo
cal Origin of Field Potentials in Visual Cortex. Neuron, 61(1), pp. 35-41.
Kitano, H. (2002). Systems Biology: A Brief Overview. Science, 295(5560), pp. 16621664.
Kola, I. andJ. Landis (2004). Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 3(8), pp. 711-715.
Kramer, L.A. and R. Greek (2018). Human Stakeholders and the Use of Animals in Drug
Development. Business and Society Review, , 123(1), pp. 3-58.
Kummar, S., R. Kinders, L. Rubinstein, RE. Parchment, A.J. Murga, J. Collins, 0. Pickeral
and J. Low (2007). Compressing Drug Development Timelines in Oncology Using
Phase 'o' Trials. Nature Reviews Cancer, 7(2), pp. 131-139.
LaFollette, H. and N. Shanks (1996). Brute science: Dilemmas ofanimal experimentation.
London: Routledge.
LaFollette, H. and N. Shanks (1998). Claude Bernard: The founder of the paradigm. In:
M. Bekoff, ed., The Encyclopedia ofAnimal Rights. Westport, C T : Greenwood Pub
lishing, pp. 91-92.
LeCouter, J.E., B. Kablar, P.F. Whyte, C. Ying, M.A. Rudnicki (1998). Strain-dependent
Emb ryonic Lethality in Mice Lacking the Retinoblastoma-related p130 Gene. Devel
opment, 125, pp. 4669-4679.
Lesko, L.J. and J. Woodcock (2004). Translation of Pharmacogenomics and
Pharmacogenetics: A Regulatory Perspective. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 3(9),
pp. 763-769.
Lin, J.H. (1995). Species Similarities and Differences in Pharmacokinetics. Drug Me
tabolism and Disposition: The Biological Fate of Chemicals, 23( 10 ), pp. 1008-1021.

Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS WITH USING NON-HUMAN ANIMALS

413

Litchfield, J.T., Jr. (1962 ). Symposium on clinical drug evaluation and human pharma
cology. XVI. Evaluation of the safety of new drugs by means of tests in animals.
Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 3, pp. 665-672.
Lumley, C. (1990 ). Clinical toxicity: could it have been predicted? Premarketing experi
ence. In: C. Lumley and S. Walker, eds., Animal Toxicity Studies: Their Relevancefor
Man. London : Quay, pp. 49-56.
Macleod, M. (2004). Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Experimental Stroke. In
temationaljoumal ofNeuroprotection andNeuroregeneration 1, pp. 9-12.
Mahmood, I. (2000). Can Absolute Oral Bioavailability in Humans Be Predicted from
Animals? A Comparison of Allometry and Different Indirect Methods. Drug Me
tabolism and Drug Interactions, 16(2), pp. 143-155.
Marchetta, M.C., I. Narvaiza, A.M. Denli, C. Denner, T.A. Lazzarini, J.L. Nathanson, A.C.
Paquola, K.N. Desai, R.H. Herai, M.D. Weitzman, G.W. Yeo, A.R. Muotri and F.H.
Gage (2013) Differential L1 Regulation in Pluripotent Stem Cells of Humans and
Apes. Nature, 503( 7477), pp. 525-529.
Medical Research Modernization Committee ( 2006). A Critical Look at Animal Experi
mentation. [ online] Available at: http:/ /mrmcmed.org/Critical_Look.pdf [ Accessed
6 February 2018] .
Morange, M. (2001). A Successful Form for Reductionism. The Biochemist 23(6),
pp. 37-39.
Morley, M., C.M. Molony, T.M. Weber, J.L. Devlin, K.G. Wewns, R.S. Spielman and V.G.
Cheung (2004). Genetic Analysis of Genome-wide Variation in Human Gene Ex
pression. Nature, 430(7001 ), pp. 743- 747.
Morowitz, H.J. ( 2002 ). The emergence of everything: How the world became complex. Ox
ford: Oxford University Press.
Nagarsheth, K. and S. Kurek ( 2011 ). Ultrasound Detection of Pneumothorax Compared
with Chest X-ray and Computed Tomography Scan. The American surgeon, 77(4),
pp. 480-484.
National Academies of Science Engineering Medicine ( 2016 ). Is Evolution a Theory or a
Fact?. [ online] Available at: http:/ /www.nas.edu/evolution/TheoryOrFact.html [ Ac
cessed 8 June 2017].
National Science Foundation ( 2011) Press Release: OfMice andMen. [ online] Available at:
http:/ /www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=121653&org=NSF&from=news
[Accessed 8 June 2017].
Northrop, R.B. (2011). Introduction to complexity and complex systems. Boca Raton: CRC
Press.
O'Collins, V.E., M.R. Macleod, S.F. Cox, L. Van Raay, E. Aleksoska, G.A. Donnan and
D.W. Howells (2011). Preclinical Drug Evaluation for Combination Therapy in Acute
Stroke Using Systematic Review, Meta-analysis, and Subsequent Experimental Test
ing.Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and Metabolism, 31(3), pp. 962-975.

Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

414

GREEK AND KRAMER

O'Collins, V.E., M.R. Macleod, G.A. Donnan, L.L. Horky, B.H. van der Worp and
D.W. Howells (2006). 1,026 Experimental Treatments in Acute Stroke. Annals ofNeu
rology, 59(3), pp. 467-477.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018). Animal Welfare.
[ online ] . Available at: http:/ /www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/testing/animal-welfare
.htm [Accessed 1 February 2018] .
Pearson, H. (2002). Surviving a Knockout Blow. Nature, 415(6867), pp. 8-9.
Pritchard, C., D. Coil, S. Hawley, L Hsu and P.S. Nelson (2006). The Contributions of
Normal Variation and Genetic Background to Mammalian Gene Expression. Ge
nome Biology, 7:R26.
Raineri, I., E.J. Carlson, R. Gacayan, S. Carra, T.D. Oberley, T.T. Huang and C.J. Epstein
(2001). Strain-dependent High-level Expression of a Transgene for Manganese Su
peroxide Dismutase Is Associated with Growth Retardation and Decreased Fertility.
Free Radical Biology and Medicine, 31(8), pp. 1018-1030.
Rifkin, S.A., J. Kim and K.P. White (2003). Evolution of Gene Expression in the Dro
sophila Melanogaster Subgroup. Nature Genetics, 33( 2 ), pp. 138-144.
Rosen, R. (1999). Essays on Life itself. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rosenberg, N.A., J.K. Pritchard, J.L. Weber, H.M. Cann, K.K. Kidd, L.A. Zhivotovsky and
M.W. Feldman (2002). Genetic Structure of Human Populations. Science, 298(5602),
pp. 2381-2385.
Rudczynski, A.B. (2011). Letter. New Haven Register, [ online ]. Available at: http:/ /www
.nhregister.com/article/NH/20110325/NEWS/303259946 [ Accessed 8 June 2017].
Sandberg, R., R. Yasuda, D.G. Pankratz, T.A. Carter, J.A. Del Rio, L. Wodicka, M. Mayford,
D.J. Lockhart and C. Barlow ( 2000 ). Regional and Strain-specific Gene Expression
Mapping in the Adult Mouse Brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science
of the United States ofAmerica, 97( 20 ), pp. 11038-11043.
Sena, E., H.B. van der Worp, D. Howells and M. Macleod ( 2007 ). How Can We Improve
the Preclinical Development of Drugs for Stroke? Trends in Neurosciences, 30(9),
pp. 433-439.
Seok, J., H.S. Warren, A.G. Cuenca, M.N. Mindrinos, H.V. Baker, W. Xu, D.R. Richards,
G.P. McDonald-Smith, H. Gao, L. Hennessy, C.C. Finnerty, C.M. Lopez, S. Honari,
E.E. Moore, J.P. Minei, J. Cuschieri, P.E. Bankey, J.L. Johnson, J. Sperry, A.B. Nathens,
T.R. Billiar, M.A. West, M.G. Jeschke, M.B. Klein, R.L. Gamelli, N.S. Gibran, B.H.
Brownstein, C. Miller-Graziano, S.E. Calvano, P.H. Mason, J.P. Cobb, L.G. Rahme, S.F.
Lowry, R.V. Maier, L.L. Moldawer, D.N. Herndon, R.W. Davis, W. Xiao, R.G. Tomp
kins and Inflammation and Host Response to Injury, Large Scale Collaborative Re
search Program (2013). Genomic Responses in Mouse Models Poorly Mimic Human
Inflammatory Diseases. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States ofAmerica, 110(9), pp. 3507-3512.
Shanks, N. and R. Greek (2008). Experimental Use of Non-human Primates Is Not a
Simple Problem. Nature Medicine 14(10 ), p. 1012.
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS WITH USING NON-HUMAN ANIMALS

415

Shanks, N. and R. Greek ( 2009 ). Animal models in Light of evolution. Boca Raton: Brown
Walker.
Shanks, N., R. Greek and J. Greek (2009). Are Animal Models Predictive for Humans?.
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine, 4:2.
Shanks, N. and R.A Pyles. ( 2007 ). Evolution and Medicine: The Long Reach of Dr. Dar
win. Philosophy, Ethics Humanities in Medicine, 2, p. 4.
Shepard, T. and R. Lemire (2004). Catalog of teratogenic agents, nth ed. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins.
Smietana, K., M. Siatkowski and M. Moller (2016). Trends in Clinical Success Rates.
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 15(6), pp. 379-380.
Smith, R.L. and J. Caldwell (1977). Drug metabolism in non-human primates. In: D.V.
Parke and R.L. Smith, eds., Drug Metabolism. From Microbe to Man. London: Taylor &
Francis, pp. 331-356.
Sole, R. and B. Goodwin (2002). Signs of Life: How complexity pe-rvades biology. New
York: Basic Books.
Spriet-Pourra, C. and M. Auriche (1994). SCRIP reports, 2nd ed. New York: PJB
Publications.
Storey, J.D., J. Madeoy, J.L. Strout, M. Wurfel, J. Ronald and J.M. Akey (2007). Gene
expression Variation within and among Human Populations. Americanjournaf of
Human Genetics, 80(3), pp. 502-509.
Suter, K. (1990). What can be learned from case studies? The company approach. In:
C. Lumley and S. Walker, eds., Animal Toxicity Studies: Their Relevancefor Man. Lan
caster: Quay, pp. 71-78.
Suzuki, Y. and M. Nakayama (2003). Differential Profiles of Genes Expressed in Neo
natal Brain of 129Xi/SvJ and C57BL /6J Mice: A Database to Aid in Analyzing
DNA Microarrays Using Nonisogenic Gene-targeted Mice. DNA Research, 10(6),
pp. 263-275.
van Meer, P.J., M.L. Graham and H.J. Schuurman (2015). The Safety, Efficacy, and Regu
latory Triangle in Drug Development: Impact for Animal Models and the Use of
Animals. Europeanjournal ofPharmacology , 759, pp. 3-13.
van Meer, P.J.K., M. Kooijman, C.C. Gispen-de Wied, E.H.M. Moors and H. Schellek
ens ( 2012 ). The Ability of Animal Studies to Detect Serious Post Marketing Adverse
Events Is Limited. Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, 64(3), pp. 345-349.
Van Regenmortel, M. (2002). Reductionism and the Search for Structure-function
Relationships in Antibody Molecules. journal of Molecular Recognition, 15(5),
pp. 240-247.
Van Regenmortel, M. ( 2004a ). Biological Complexity Emerges from the Ashes of
Genetic Reductionism.journal ofMolecular Recognition, 17(3), pp. 145-148.
Van Regenmortel, M. (2004b). Reductionism and Complexity in Molecular Biology.
Scientists Now Have the Tools to Unravel Biological Complexity and Overcome the
Limitations of Reductionism. EMBO Reports, 5(11), pp. 1016-1020.
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

416

GREEK AND KRAMER

Van Regenmortel, M.H. and D.L. Hull ( 2002 ). Promises and limits of reductionism in the
biomedical sciences (Catalystsforfine chemical synthesis). West Sussex: Wiley.
Varki, A. and T.K. Altheide (2005). Comparing the Human and Chimpanzee Genomes:
Searching for Needles in a Haystack. Genome Research, 15(12), pp. 1746-1758.
Vicsek, T. (2002). The BIGGER PICTure. Nature, 418(6894), p. 131.
Vojinovic, M. (2015a). Reductionism, Emergence, and Burden of Proof - Part I. Scien
tia Salon. [ online] Available at: https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/01/14/
reductionism-emergence-and-burden-of-proof-part-if [Accessed 8 June 2017 ] .
Vojinovic, M. (2015b). Reductionism, Emergence, and Burden of Proof - Part II. Sci
entia Salon. [ online] Available at: https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/ 01/16/
reductionism-emergence-and-burden-of-proof-part-ii/ [ Accessed 8 June 2017 ] .
Warren, H.S., R.G. Tompkins, L.L. Moldawer, J. Seok, W. Xu, M.N. Mindrinos, R.V. Maier,
W. Xiao and R.W. Davis ( 2014). Mice Are Not Men. Proceedings of the National Acad
emy ofSciences, 112(4), pp. E347-E348.
Weaver, J.L., D. Staten, J. Swann, G Armstrong, M. Bates and K.L. Hastings (2003).
Detection of Systemic Hypersensitivity to Drugs Using Standard Guinea Pig Assays.
Toxicology, 193(3), pp. 203-217.
Zhang, W., S. Duan, E.O. Kistner, W.K. Bleibel, R.S. Huang, T.A. Clark, T.X. Chen, A.C.
Schweitzer, J.E. Blume, N.J. Cox and M.E. Dolan (2008). Evaluation of Genetic Varia
tion Contributing to Differences in Gene Expression Between Populations. Ameri
can]oumal ofHuman Genetics, 82(3), pp. 631-640.

Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

